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Interpreting Data:
A Reply to Professor Pardo
by
Robert M. Lawless, Angela K. Littwin, Katherine M. Porter,
John A. E. Pottow, Deborah K. Thorne, and Elizabeth Warren*
Professor Pardo has published a pointed critique' to our Report, 2 raising
three major complaints. First, he claims that we make two predicating as-
sumptions in our study that are flawed.3 Second, he contends that we misun-
derstand the means test and fail to appreciate with sufficient "nuance" its
"operative effect." 4 Third, he maintains that our Report suffers from method-
ological problems.5
We can address the two impugned assumptions quickly. The first one -
that BAPCPA's means test is the sole causal agent driving 800,000 putative
filers from the bankruptcy courts6 - is not one we make. The second -
regarding the income profiles of the missing 800,000 bankruptcy filers 7 - is
actually somewhat consistent with predictions Professor Pardo himself makes
*Professor Pottow is corresponding author for this manuscript. The co-authors' names appear in alpha-
betical order, however, to reflect the significant contribution made by each in various ways. The co-
authors' institutional affiliations follow: Robert M. Lawless, Professor of Law and Galowich-Huizenga
Faculty Scholar, University of Illinois College of Law (rlawless@illinois.edu); Angela K. Littwin, Assistant
Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law (alittwin@law.utexas.edu); Katherine M. Porter,
Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law (katie.porter@uiowa.edu); John A. E.
Pottow, Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School (pottow@umich.edu); Deborah K. Thorne,
Assistant Professor of Sociology, Ohio University (thorned@ohio.edu); Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gottlieb
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School (cbateson@law.harvard.edu). Acknowledgements of our co-princi-
pal investigators and other helpful colleagues, advisers and assistants appear at the outset of the initial
Report.
'Rafael I. Pardo, Failing to Answer Whether Bankruptcy Reform Failed: A Critique of the First Report
from the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 27 (2009).
2Robert M. Lawless, Angela K. Littwin, Katherine M. Porter, John A. E. Pottow, Deborah K. Thorne,
& Elizabeth Warren, Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 349 (2008) [hereinafter "Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?"].
'Pardo, supra note 1, at 28 (faulting two "questionable" assumptions).
4E.g., id. at 33-34 (lamenting that there is "a need for nuance that is missing from the First Report" and
offering a distinction between the "purpose" and "operative effect" of the means test).
'Id. at 29 (claiming the existence of "several methodological deficiencies").
61d. at 30 ("First, the Report assumes that but for BAPCPA's enactment, there would have been
slightly more than 1.6 million bankruptcy filings in 2007.").
71d. at 31 "(Without this assumption [of similar income], no . . .inference can be made [regarding
bankrupt debtors' income profiles].").
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elsewhere in his critique.s The thrust of Professor Pardo's commentary, how-
ever, is his second point - that we simply "don't get" the means test - and so
we begin our response by addressing this contention. We then discuss our
methodology, which we believe is quite robust, before finally elaborating on
why we are sanguine in dismissing his complaints with the two assumptions
he claims we make.
I. BAPCPA'S MEANS TEST
Professor Pardo claims that we misconceive the true role and function of
the means test and, as such, embark upon a fool's errand with our Report.9
We begin by repeating our understanding of the means test and then present
Professor Pardo's very different one.
We believe that BAPCPA's proponents designed the means test to deter
high-income ("can pay") debtors from filing for bankruptcy relief under chap-
ter 7 by subjecting them to an onerous statutory eligibility screen.'0 The
intended effect is either to force these debtors to file for relief under chapter
13 or to forgo bankruptcy relief altogether." We test that presumption and
discover that it is inconsistent with our data.12
Professor Pardo chides us for lacking "nuance" in this description of the
means test.13 He instead bifurcates what he calls the "express purpose" of the
means test from the "implied purpose."' 4 (He then expands his taxonomy to
encompass the "operative effect" of the means test - which implements its
express purpose - and the "deterrent effect," which merely implements its
implied purpose.) 15 Our description, Professor Pardo complains, merely cap-
tures the implied, deterrent purpose of the means test: to deter high-income
people from filing for chapter 7. But we miss the (presumably more impor-
tant) express purpose: means-testing people who do in fact file for chapter 7
and then dismissing or converting the cases of the subset who flunk the
screen. In his words:
[T]he express purpose of the means test was not deterrence
but rather the screening of a particular subset of the con-
'Id. at n.21, discussed infra at text accompanying note 70.
9Id. at 32 ("To understand the flaws in the First Report's research question and methodology that
preclude it from answering whether bankruptcy reform failed, one must recognize that the Report does
not adequately account for the purpose of the means test or the complexity of its provision.").
"°Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?, supra note 2, at 352-53, 356,57.
11Id
.
"SId. at 363.
"
5 Pardo, supra note 1, at 28 (bemoaning "[in]adequate account," "incomplete analysis" and "missing"
"nuance" of our discussion of the means test); id. at 34-35 (lamenting "broad generalizations" that do not
"delve into the complexity of the means-test formula" and thus are "quite unfortunate").
14Id. at 32.
i51d. at 34, 38 n.47.
(Vol. 83
INTERPRETING DATA - A REPLY TO PARDO
sumer bankruptcy population - that is, the above-median
debtors who have filed for Chapter 7 relief. In other words,
the means test is meant to affect the filing population rather
than the nonfiling population. 16
This divergence of conception of the means test - ours focused on its
upstream deterrent effects and Professor Pardo's on its intra-bankruptcy "op-
erative" effects - leads to a difference of opinion regarding what we should be
looking at to gauge its efficacy. We believe that we should look at whether
people are indeed deterred from filing for chapter 7 (or bankruptcy relief
more generally) after BAPCPA, which Professor Pardo scolds as focusing
"exclusively on the deterrent effect of the means test."17 By contrast, Profes-
sor Pardo believes we should be looking at how the means test is working:
how many cases are converting/dismissing debtors' petitions under chapter 7
when they have incomes that are too high. He admonishes that "any evalua-
tion of whether the means test has been a success would, at a minimum, need
to consider its effects on the filing population that it has targeted - specifi-
cally, by examining the dismissal and conversion of Chapter 7 cases under the
abuse dismissal framework and ascertaining whether that group of cases sta-
tistically significantly differs in a substantively meaningful way from those
cases that remain in Chapter 7."18
We hold to our understanding of the means test and the concomitant
research questions it generates. With respect, Professor Pardo's alternative
strikes us as naive because it assumes that all debtors (and their lawyers)
simply file their cases and then wait to see if they pass the means test. We
think nothing of the sort occurs. Rather, debtors who know they will flunk
the means test simply are advised not to file-and do not file-in chapter 7.
It is whimsical to suggest that they do file, presumably checking the box to
indicate that they flunk the means test, and then wait for their dismissal
(perhaps hoping they'll slip through the cracks?). Of the 1,556 chapter 7
filers in our study, exactly three of them (0.2%) filed a chapter 7 petition that
on its face failed the means test.19 Even Professor Pardo eventually concedes,
albeit only in a footnote, that the law has ex ante incentive effects that might
deter such pointless conduct, but he sees that as a sidebar: "In all likelihood,
[the means test] does have some deterrent effect on some debtors .... That
said, the statutory language of the means test clearly operationalizes an aspect
of case administration . 20. "2o And herein lies the crux of the disagreement: in
16d. at 33 (emphasis added).
17d.
"Id. (emphasis added).
19These numbers are based on calculations done for purposes of this reply.
2 5Pardo, supra note 1, at 38 n.47.
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our view, deterring high-income filers from chapter 7 was not a secondary
"implied" goal of BAPCPA; it was BAPCPA's animating purpose.
To illustrate the significance of our conceptual difference, we think a hy-
pothetical analogy might be helpful. Imagine (leaving aside constitutional
problems) a BAPCPA-like reform called the "Litigation Masculinization Re-
form Act" that requires any civil complaint filed by a female plaintiff to be
dismissed. Professor Pardo would say that the "operative effect" of this law
is limited to the universe of people who still file lawsuits after its enactment
(one presumes overwhelmingly male). Accordingly, he would insist that aca-
demic studies analyzing the new law should look at how well dismissal mo-
tions cull women. He might then acknowledge that a secondary, "deterrent"
effect would be dissuading women from filing lawsuits in the first place but
he would relegate that as the statute's "implied" purpose at best, not its "ex-
press" one. By contrast, we would say that the whole purpose of such a law
would be to deter women from filing lawsuits and to exclude them from the
courts. Scholarly analysis in our view should therefore look at how many
women filed lawsuits before and after the statute to understand how many
women were excluded - not simply look at how many women who did file
complaints subsequent to enactment had their actions dismissed. (Indeed, it
is not clear to us what we would be looking for in such an inquiry; absent
irregularity, we would expect the dismissal rate of such women to approach
100%.) The purpose of such a law is clearly deterrent. That the mechanism
for so deterring is automatic dismissal of female plaintiffs' complaints is
merely the mode of its procedural execution.
Accordingly, rather than apologize for our purportedly "un-nuanced" un-
derstanding of the means test, we stand by it. We think we accurately com-
prehend what the years of legislative squabbling were all about and were
consequently correct to focus on deterrence in framing our research
questions.21
II. OUR METHODOLOGY
Professor Pardo argues in the alternative that even if we are right in our
deterrence-based understanding of the means test and the attendant ques-
tions to ask, our execution is flawed. 22 He makes two major methodological
complaints: first, that a potential sample bias prohibits us from properly com-
2 1We remind readers that the Report explores BAPCPA on the terms framed by its proponents. We
accepted at face value the public claims of the means test's champions that it would "screen out the can-
pays and high-income crowd who were purportedly abusing the system." Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?,
supra note 2, at 351-52. As we emphasize in our discussion of and agreement with Professor James J.
White's insightful work, we also do not doubt that the sophisticated consumer lenders who lobbied for
BAPCPA's passage had unstated private motives to push for the means test. See id. at 380-81.
22See Pardo, supra note 1, at 29.
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paring our new 2007 data with our previous 2001 data;2 3 and second, that
the metric we used for comparison - gross income - is inapposite in light of
the means test's ultimate consideration of disposable income.24
A. REPRESENTATIVENESS OF CBP SAMPLE
In 2007, thanks to improved online access and the generosity of
AACER,25 we drew a nationwide random sample from all judicial districts.
By contrast, in 2001, we physically traveled (or found local help) and sampled
from only five judicial districts.26 Professor Pardo articulates what statisti-
cians would call a "sample bias" concern regarding this approach. 27 It goes
like this: the debtors in 2007 were a true random sample from all jurisdictions
but the debtors in 2001 were drawn from only five jurisdictions. If those five
places were not representative of the nation as a whole, then when we com-
pared the 2001 data with the national sample of 2007, any differences or
similarities could result from the change in our sampling method.
To be clear: the problem is not with taking a sample from five places per
se. If those five jurisdictions are representative of the broader population of
cases, it is appropriate and reliable to draw inferences from the sample regard-
ing the population. But if those five are somehow atypical along dimensions
potentially relevant to our analysis, then the 2001 sample should not be com-
pared to a national sample. For example, if the five states we had chosen in
2001 were Hawaii, California, Alaska, New York, and New Jersey, we would
have selected the states that have the five highest costs of living in the
United States.28 Perhaps then the bankrupt debtors in those places were not
reflective of the average bankrupt debtor nationally and thus would skew our
findings (for example, by having disproportionately higher expenses on Sched-
ule J in chapter 13).
Professor Pardo suggests a concern along these very lines - that the five
states we picked in 2001 might be unusual in terms of their income profiles. 29
What if, as he suggests, the 2001 sample came from all low-income states?
That would make our 2001 income numbers artificially low and not reflec-
tive of the nation as a whole. Thus, we might have not detected an actual
"See id. at 38.
24See id. at 41.
25The Automated Access to Court Electronic Records. See AACER, http://AACER.com (last vis-
ited February 2, 2009).
26See Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?, supra note 2, at 389-90.
27Pardo, supra note 1, at 39-40.
2SSee Missouri Economic Research and Information Center, "Cost of Living Data Series, Third Quar-
ter 2008," http://www.missourieconomy.org/indicators/cost-of living/index.stm. (last visited February
1, 2009).
29 Pardo, supra note 1, at 39-40.
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change in filers' incomes after BAPCPA (meaning, in turn, that BAPCPA's
means test was more effective than we give it credit).
In his own words:
First, the Report fails to address the implications of compar-
ing a nationwide random sample of bankruptcy cases drawn
solely from federal judicial districts in California, Illinois,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas (i.e., the 2001 CBP).
That the 2001 CBP sample is not necessarily representative
of debtors nationwide, a point expressly acknowledged by
the CBP, is problematic. For example, according to the Cen-
sus 2000, the median national household incomes in 1999 of
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas were below the median
household income of the entire United States. If this state of
affairs remained unchanged as of 2001, it would mean that 3
out of the 5 states from which bankruptcy cases were drawn
for the 2001 CBP were from states with median household
incomes below the national median. If the income from the
2001 CBP were skewed toward the lower end of the income
scale, the showing that the income data from 2007 CBP was
indistinguishable from the 2001 CBP would not establish
that the means test had failed to deter high-income debtors
from filing for Chapter 7 relief (and, in fact, would possibly
suggest the opposite).30
Framed thus, it appears Professor Pardo has a legitimate sample bias con-
cern, and one that may well have an impact on the inferences we draw in our
article. After all, if three of the five states have disproportionately low in-
comes in the general population (and we assume that the bankruptcy filers
have similarly disproportionately low incomes matching their state trends),
perhaps CBP 2001 picked unrepresentatively low-income states.
What Professor Pardo elects not to mention in this critique, however, is
that the other two states in the CBP 2001 sample - California and Illinois -
had disproportionately high incomes in the very same Census. Professor
Pardo highlights only the three states with low incomes and creates the im-
pression that we should have concerns with a low-income skew sample bias,
while he omits the full picture: three states have low incomes and two have
high incomes. With this more accurate presentation, we do not see the skew
3
°
0 d. (footnotes omitted). We should clarify Professor Pardo's reference to our other work. What we
"expressly acknowledge" is that a five-jurisdiction sample, a fortiori, is "not necessarily" a representative
sample, but that of course is a tautology. We do not concede this is 'problematic." On the contrary, our
prior research is in fact based upon the representativeness of that sample, which as we mention in the text,
is empirically sound.
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concern. On the contrary, we are heartened that this implies the five states
indeed were collectively representative for a set of five states (three low, two
high). Because Professor Pardo's ultimate admission that the two other states
have higher incomes is confined to a footnote, 31 we believe he has not been
entirely forthcoming in his critique of our sample methods. Surely the reader
consuming the text only, which mentions the three low-income states, but
not the footnote that reveals the other two states as high-income, might get
the impression of a possible low-income skew.
Aside from the selective data presentation issue, there is an even greater
problem with Professor Pardo's purported concern over sample bias. Being
prudent empiricists, we had already conducted sample bias checks in analyzing
our 2001 data to see if they compared with the 2007 data. They did. And
we referenced these tests our article.3 2 To be sure, we could have been
clearer and more detailed in our mention of what was done.33 On the other
hand, we think we had a reasonable fear of driving away our audience by
belaboring arcane methodological points of "non-findings" in a journal whose
readers are not primarily empirical researchers. Indeed, part of our decision
not to bother reporting our "non-findings" of no bias was that we had no
theory why there would be a bias in the first place, raising an epistemologi-
cally intriguing question of what unimagined concerns we need to say we
already knew about. In any event, for readers who are curious, we reran the
numbers from the 2007 filers using just the debtors from the five states that
constituted the 2001 CBP sample rather than the full nationwide sample to
see if any of our results came out differently. None did. (In fact, one came
out slightly stronger for our conclusions, but the overall point was so small
that we elected not to mention this in the article.) As we mentioned in the
Report, and now repeat for added clarity, it is methodologically sound to
compare the 2001 five-jurisdiction CBP sample with the 2007 nationwide
CBP sample.
B. GROSS INCOME METRIC
The second major complaint Professor Pardo has with our methods is the
decision to use gross income as the metric for gauging the implementation of
the means test.34 In his opinion, we should have used the new BAPCPA
concept of "disposable income" - the debtor's remaining income after the sec-
"
1Id. at n.54 (citing Census 2000 data).
32Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?, supra note 2, at 355 n.32 ('Our prior studies were not random national
samples but random samples drawn from five judicial districts. We have no reason to believe this affects
the comparisons we make to earlier cohorts of bankruptcy filers.").
33Professor Pardo faults us for this brevity. See Pardo, supra note 1, at 40 & n.56.
34See id. at 41.
2009)
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tion 707(b)-allowed deductions under the means test.35 Professor Pardo's cri-
tique is again quite pointed, rejecting our use of gross income as
"unsuitable"36 and "odd."37 He opines: "Thus, [gross] income by itself is too
broad of a metric for ascertaining what deterrent effect, if any, the means test
has had in deterring individuals from filing for Chapter 7."38 We disagree on
both normative and methodological grounds.
Why is Professor Pardo so dismissive of our metric? Again, it comes
down to different understandings of the means test. The means test has two
parts: the gross income screen 39 and the disposable income screen. 40 The
gross income screen lets below-median income debtors avoid the complex
statutory test of permissible deductions to determine chapter 7 eligibility;
they pass the means test as a matter of law.4 a Above-median income debtors
face a different statutory burden. They can be eligible for chapter 7 too, but
only after they have run the means test gauntlet in its full detail. If their
permissible expense deductions leave them with little enough "disposable in-
come," then - but only then - they pass and escape the presumption of
abuse.42
Professor Pardo appears to believe that the means test matters only to
those who flunk it. That is, for above-median income debtors who face the
means test but who ultimately pass, itemizing their expenses in fine detail for
creditor and judicial review was no big deal - nothing more than a passing
inconvenience of insignificant moment: "High-income debtors need not worry
about the means test provided that they have a level of disposable income
that is insufficient to trigger the presumption of abuse under the means
test."4 3
We disagree strenuously. The means test gauntlet subjects debtors to
pervasive judicial and creditor scrutiny and opens the door to objections
whose resolutions can render a debtor ineligible for chapter 7. None of us to
date has met a practitioner who would be willing to tell an above-median
income client seeking chapter 7 relief "not to worry" about the means test
because all the client's deductions are ironclad and will lead to a qualifyingly
low disposable income.44 Professor Pardo, by contrast, considers the possibil-
351d. at 42.36 d. at 41.
37 d. at 29.
3SId. at 41.
3911 U.S.C. §§ 707(b)(6), 707(b)(7) (2008).
4011 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2008).
4111 U.S.C. §§ 707(b)(6), 707(b)(7) (2008).
4211 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2) (2008).
43Pardo, supra note 1, at 41; see also id. at 37 ("[T]he concern for an above-median debtor considering
Chapter 7 relief is not one regarding total income but rather one regarding disposable income.").
44An attorney who files a chapter 7 case that is later determined to be ineligible faces the possibility of
(Vol. 83
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ity that above-median debtors will be perturbed by this heightened judicial
and creditor scrutiny "highly unrealistic."45 Suffice it to say our sense of
realism under the means test differs from his; perhaps he has a stronger belief
in the legal clarity of BAPCPA's deductions, the ease with which the ex-
penses can be calculated and verified, or the fortitude of debtor nerves. Thus,
we maintain it is entirely appropriate to use gross income as a metric to gauge
the means test's impact on normative grounds.
There is an equally important methodological reason that we stand by
our decision. Because there was no such thing as "disposable income" in the
means test sense before BAPCPA, we do not have any 2001 data that are
directly comparable with the 2007 disposable income data. Professor Pardo
suggests that we could, in his words, "engineer" variables such as hypothetical
disposable income from 2001 using, inter alia, Schedule J expenses. 46 "While
this measure of disposable income would not be perfectly congruent with the
measure of disposable income set forth in the means test, it would nonethe-
less be a better metric for evaluating debtor behavior in response to the
means test than [gross] income generally."47
We applaud Professor Pardo's motivations in trying to construct the
most apposite variable. The problem, however, with this idea is endogeneity.
Here is the conundrum: if a researcher attempts to work out people's food
expenses, car expenses, secured debt, etc., per the means test standards by
plucking numbers from Schedule Js in the 2001 cases, it will be necessary to
assume that if those people had filed under a BAPCPA regime their reported
expenses would have been identical. But we cannot know that. With
BAPCPA in place, debtors who know that some expenses will be permissible
under the means test have an incentive to shift their discretionary expenses
into the permissible categories and shade ambiguous expenses that could fall
under multiple plausible classifications as falling under means-test-eligible de-
ductions. A synthetic means-test "disposable income" variable constructed
from 2001 cases cannot tell us reliably how those same debtors would have
reported (and even incurred) expenses in 2007. This challenge brings us to
an important point regarding the conduct of empirical research: investigators
must make judgment calls based on logical inference and common sense.
Guided by caution, we concluded that we could not be safe in constructing
2001 hypothetical means-test disposable income and so empirical prudence
sanctions and personal liability. 11 U.S.C. §§ 707(b)(4)(A) & (B) (2008). The almost inescapable conclu-
sion is that Congress wanted attorneys to use caution when filing Chapter 7 cases, and the clearest way
for attorneys to exercise caution in this matter is to think twice when the debtor's income is above-
median.
45Pardo, supra note 1, at 44.
4 Id. at 42 n.68.
471d.
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required staying with the more objective and consistent gross income
measure.
48
Finally with regard to our methodology, we note that Professor Pardo
raises some other quibbles.49 We respond only to the two major ones in this
reply, but we do not concede his criticisms on the other points. We will offer
by way of example our reaction to one of his additional complaints. At one
juncture, Professor Pardo faults us for not excluding certain business cases
from our analysis: "In conducting its statistical analysis of differences in in-
come levels, the Report did not exclude cases filed by individuals whose
debts consisted of primarily business debts [and hence do not face the means
test] .... It may be possible that inclusion would not skew the Report's
results, but the Report does not address the issue and thus fails to assuage
concerns on this front."so
This is an example of a criticism that sounds like it may raise something
important but, upon further reflection, does not. Indeed, Professor Pardo
carefully does not say that this omission skews our data, only that it may do
so - although this potential raises "concern" that in his mind demands "assua-
gance." So what is the concern? By failing to exclude cases designated as
having primarily business debts, we may be getting debtors who distort the
income of our sample pool (presumably upward; one predicts businesses have
higher incomes than individuals).
We reject this possibility as far-fetched. First, our pool only includes
natural persons, so legal entities (such as corporations), which some if not
many businesses are likely to be constituted as, are excluded at the outset.5 '
4 In revising his draft of this commentary, Professor Pardo now confronts the potential concern of
endogeneity in the third paragraph of a multi-paged footnote. See Pardo, supra note 1, at 42 n.68 ("While
possible that the legal significance placed on income and expenses by the means test may have changed the
incentives of postBAPCPA debtors in documenting these amounts ... it seems reasonable to conclude
that this would not be the case . .. ."). We refer interested readers to that lengthy discussion if so inclined;
suffice it to say we are less sanguine than Professor Pardo at dismissing the endogeneity issue presented.
49See, e.g., id. at 43-44 (regarding state variation); id. at 44 n.71 (citing one of our earlier works in
response to this concern).
501d. at 40 (emphasis added). In an adjacent footnote, Professor Pardo faults alternative calculations
we ran when we did make these exclusions. See id. at n.59. Our response to his broader critique in the
text above necessarily dismisses this narrower critique.
"In any event, the line between a "consumer" bankruptcy and a "business" bankruptcy is not as stark
as the nomenclature implies. For example, consider the discussion two of us once wrote in a separate
context:
Entrepreneurs can slip into the personal bankruptcy column, which raises the tanta,
lizing question of whether the prototype small business may be changing from a
small shop to a consultant. The small shop would have been widely regarded as a
business separate from its owner, a discrete entity that might or might not have
been incorporated. In contrast, the consultant who continues the same work that
was once salaried and has now been outsourced is a very different kind of entrepre-
neur. Such a person is someone for whom there is no real separation between the
(Vol. 83
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Second, the historical number of these individual (non-entity) debtors who
check the "primarily business debts" box is minuscule: 0.5% in 2001 and 1.8%
in 2007.52 To worry about this tiny subset skewing our large data pool, we
would have to imagine these few debtors as having wildly high incomes suffi-
cient to move our overall findings. Yet wildly high figures were also ex-
cluded, as we make clear in our methodological appendix when discussing our
protocol of removing statistical outliers.53 Thus, we are nonplussed trying to
ascertain just what fact pattern of potential data-skewing Professor Pardo
envisions that we "fail[ ] to assuage." 54
Accordingly, we remain unperturbed by Professor Pardo's methodological
challenges. We have every confidence in the representativeness of the 2001
CBP sample and feel heartened by our own (already mentioned) bias checks.
We also believe that gross income remains the best and most reliable measure
for examining BAPCPA's means test. While Professor Pardo assures that
above-median income debtors who list high deductible expenses under sec-
tion 707(b) "need not worry about the means test,"5 5 we maintain that they
do worry, and worry quite a bit, at having to face that scrutiny.
III. TWO PREDICATING ASSUMPTIONS
Finally we return to comment on the two assumptions that Professor
Pardo claims are foundational to our article yet flawed. Again, he casts the
consequences as dire: "Because the [ ] Report does not address the concerns
stemming from its assumptions, these concerns remain unresolved and call
into question the Report's conclusions."5 6 We again disagree with our col-
league that our assumptions are flawed and we certainly disagree with the
implication that our entire Report rises or falls with these purported
assumptions.
The first "questionable" s7 assumption Professor Pardo claims we make is
business and the self. The personal nature of the bankruptcy is readily obvious.
But this person is an entrepreneur nonetheless, dependent for income on the success
of a small business, arranging for business loans, dealing with billing and bad debts,
and at the mercy of a marketplace that may be slow or uneven.
Robert M. Lawless & Elizabeth Warren, The Myth of the Disappearing Business Bankruptcy, 93 CAL. L.
REv. 742, 791 (2005). If one is worried about the deterrent effect of BAPCPA on the ground, the grey
area between a "consumer" and a "business" is an important policy distinction not to be glossed over by
relying on checkbox characterizations on the voluntary bankruptcy petition.
52Id. at 773 tbl. 2 (reporting number of persons who checked the box as having "primarily business
debts" in the 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project as 0.5%). The 2007 numbers are from our current data
and calculated for the purpose of this reply.
5
'
3Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?, supra note 2, at 398.
14Pardo, supra note 1, at 40.
"Id. at 41.
'
561d. at 31.
7Id. at 29.
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that the means test played a causal role in deterring the 800,000 non-filers
from the bankruptcy system:
[T]he Report assumes that, but for BAPCPA's enactment,
there would have been slightly more than 1.6 million bank-
ruptcy filings in 2007 ..... What makes this assumption
problematic? . . . . [T]he Report needs to provide an ac-
count that explains why it is reasonable to assume that the
missing 800,000 did not enter the consumer bankruptcy sys-
tem in response to the existence of the means test.58
We are at a loss as to why this proposition is "problematic."5 9 On the
contrary, it was the animating premise of BAPCPA as championed by its
proponents (whose rhetoric we cite extensively in our original article) 60 and
has been seized upon by both defenders and detractors of BAPCPA as a near-
obvious given: a transformative amendment to the Bankruptcy Code, which
had the stated goal of driving legions of deadbeats from the consumer bank-
ruptcy system, was followed by a sharp reduction in the number of people
filing for bankruptcy. To us - and apparently to everyone else - causation of
some sort is imputed as res ipsa loquitor. Indeed, we might put the shoe on
the other foot to challenge Professor Pardo to explain to us how BAPCPA
did not play a causal role in reducing the number of bankruptcy petitioners
under these circumstances.
It could be, however, that he is making another, more limited argument:
that we attribute the drop in filings to the means test in particular, and not
BAPCPA in general. "[The CBP Report] casts its research question as one
that would characterize the effect of bankruptcy reform as a function of a
single provision of the Bankruptcy Code [ie., the means test]."61 But this is a
straw man; we make no such claim - again, as Professor Pardo himself some-
what acknowledges. 62 True, we say that this was the claim of BAPCPA's
supporters - and we intended to test that claim - but we then devote a
substantial part of the discussion section of our article reflecting on just what
could be causing the reduction in filings of 800,000 missing debtors given that
it cannot be the means test doing all the work.63 Professor Pardo's suggestion
that we do not consider alternatives to the means test is not just mistaken
but deeply puzzling in light of our long and detailed discussion of precisely
5 ld. at 30.
59
Id.
'See Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?, supra note 2, at 352-53.
6iPardo, supra note 1, at 30; see also id. at 28 ("[The CBP Report] assumes that enactment of the
means test deterred 800,000 individuals from filing for bankruptcy in 2007.").
62Id. at 30 n.19.
63Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?, supra note 2, at 377-85.
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such alternatives. 64
The second assumption Professor Pardo slights as "questionable"65 and
problematic" 66 is actually one that we make: that the income profiles of the
800,000 excluded filers in 2007 are likely to be similar to those still filing. Of
course, this is a working inference. It is virtually impossible to gather data on
deterred consumers who did not actually file bankruptcy, 67 and we acknowl-
edge as much in the Report.68 So we do what all good investigators do in the
absence of data; we analyze the likelihood of the various possibilities. There
are three possible income relationships between these two groups of potential
filers. The deterred group could have higher incomes than those who actu-
ally filed, they could have lower incomes, or the two groups' incomes could
be similar.
If the non-filers had lower incomes than the filers in 2007, then that
would simply strengthen our misgivings over BAPCPA backfiring and not
driving out the high-income abusers it was supposed to. We were loath to
make an assumption that would suggest the means test had the reverse effect
of attracting higher-income debtors to bankruptcy (at least without a strong
underlying theory, which we did not have and no one has yet offered).
What about higher income for the non-filers? We thought this an un-
likely possibility and stated so explicitly. As we explain in our Report:
We should articulate a necessary assumption: that there was
not a trend of rising income among those who tend to file for
bankruptcy. If such a hypothetical trend were true, then
merely showing similar incomes between bankruptcy filers
before and after BAPCPA would suggest that BAPCPA
64 We find Professor Pardo's response especially unusual in light of the fact that he acknowledges our
discussion. See Pardo, supra note 30, at 4 & n.19. But his characterization of our discussion is either
mistaken or misleading; an extensive multi-page passage of our article is buried in a footnote suggesting it is
a minor throwaway rather than a substantive analysis. "Although the First Report acknowledges the
possibility that other BAPCPA-related provisions may have had a greater effect in deterring bankruptcy
filings,[footnote] it casts the research question as one that would characterize the effect of bankruptcy
reform as a function of a single provision of the Bankruptcy Code." Id. The footnote proceeds to pincite
our references and discussion of Professor Ronald Mann's theory and later reference and discussion of
Professor James J. White's theory. It does not, however, explain that we agree with and embrace those
theories. Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?, supra note 2, at 379-81. This framing of our analysis suggests, at
least on our read, that we perhaps drop a begrudging footnote to Mann and White "acknowledg[ing]" the
"possibility" that other forces than the means test may be at work in explaining our data but then rampage
ahead relying solely on the means test as the explanatory agent. On the contrary, we embrace Mann and
White in an extensive discussion and say the exact opposite from what Professor Pardo, inexplicably,
faults us for apparently not saying - that many other forces beyond the means test must be at work. Id.
6 5Pardo, supra note 1, at 29.
661d. at 31.
67 In many cases, they might not even know who they are.
6SDid Bankruptcy Reform Fail?, supra note 2, at 375. Professor Pardo cites this acknowledgement but
nevertheless proceeds with his criticism. Pardo, supra note 1, at 31 n.23.
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succeeded in driving out the [800,000] even-higher income
debtors that we would have expected to see in bankruptcy
pursuant to this trend. In light of the flat incomes of the
U.S. population generally, and our prior research suggesting
that bankruptcy filers generally have lower (and stably
lower) incomes than the general population, we would find it
difficult to construct a model predicting such a trend.69
We stand by this position, which led us to take the most conservative
stance in the face of uncertainty: assuming that the incomes of deterred filers
are indistinguishable from actual filers - neither higher nor lower.
Does Professor Pardo offer any theories of his own regarding the income
of the excluded - how they might be higher (which would provide support
for BAPCPA's defenders) or lower (which would provide support for us)?
He does offer, in a footnote, that some of the excluded filers might have been
driven away by higher attorney's fees after BAPCPA.70 If we take that the-
ory as correct, and if we posit that those with lower incomes are the ones
least able to pay at the margin when attorney's fees increase, then the income
of the excluded 800,000 should be lower than the filing population. This
would make our findings about the regressive impact of BAPCPA even
stronger. Thus, not only is Professor Pardo unable - as were we - to con-
struct a hypothesis under which the income of the excluded debtors would
be higher in light of the available income data that we have, but his only
speculation on the matter suggests that the income profiles of the excluded
might be lower, which buttresses our conclusions.
CONCLUSION
Professor Pardo has written some insightful and helpful pieces of scholar-
ship in the bankruptcy field that we have expressly relied upon in our own
individual research projects. 71 This commentary, in our opinion, is not one of
them. Instead of offering useful ideas of how to explore the available empiri-
cal data or build new data sets, he impugns our methodology, our logical
assumptions, and our very understanding of BAPCPA's means test. With
respect for our colleague, we do not find these critiques grounded in either a
compelling theory of the operation of the bankruptcy system or a thorough
69Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?, supra note 2, at 357 n.42 (citations omitted). Professor Pardo was
aware that we explain this assumption explicitly in our work because he cites (and quotes) it. Pardo, supra
note 1, at 31 n.22.
7 0Pardo, supra note 1, at 30-31 n.21.
71See, e.g., John A. E. Pottow, The Nondischargeability of Student Loans in Personal Bankruptcy Pro-
ceedings: The Search for a Theory, 2006 CAN. Bus. L. J. 245, 264-65 (discussing findings of Rafael I. Pardo
and Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment of Discharge
of Educational Debt, 74 CINN. L. REV. 405 (2005)).
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understanding of our data. It is unfortunate so much time was spent writing
such a commentary (and response). We confess that we would rather have
been analyzing more of our data and expanding the collective knowledge
about post-BAPCPA debtors, an enterprise to which we (and Professor
Pardo) can now return.
62 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 83
